Abstract. Power generation technology is the key point of the commercialized development and utilization of renewable energy sources in existing technical conditions. Based on power market, a multi-party game market in diversified energy structure, the main factors which influence the economic benefit of game participators are summarized. In the three aspects of technology, encouragement policy and tax, the game relationship between China and the countries with mature power generation technology using renewable energy sources, between the enterprises which introduce technology to develop new technology of power generation and the enterprises with independent research and development, between traditional power generation enterprises and the power generation enterprises using renewable energy sources. The conclusion further expounds the renewable energy sources development strategy in different stages of China, the incentive functions of encouragement policy to independent research and development of new technologies and the effectiveness of carbon tax to developing renewable energy sources in power generation. It offers reference to the continuous improvement of encouragement policy for the development of renewable energy sources.
Introduction
The issue of energy safety and humans' sustainable development has gradually become a focus issue of the whole world. Our government has made a promise that the proportion of the consumption of non-fossil energy will rise for about 15% and the proportion of the discharge of CO 2 in unit GDP will decline for 40%-45% by the year 2020. It is an inevitable choice to push forward the development of the technology and industry of renewable energy. Power generation technology is still the key point of commercialized development and utilization of renewable energy in existing technical conditions. In the international experience of developing renewable energy power and the aspect of the efficiency of resource & energy allocation, price (subsidy) mechanism is an important means of promoting the development of renewable energy power. However, the power generation technologies with renewable energy are various. The commercialization development degree of them is different. The resource endowment conditions of renewable energy (they determine different structure of energy) are different in different places. The level of economic development (determining electrical load) and loading capability (determining the construction scale of power grid) are different. Therefore, the manifestation pattern of price mechanism and price level are different.
To establish flexible and high-efficiency electricity pricing mechanism, it is suggested to start from the formation feature of the cost and technology of renewable energy power and the investment environment of new energy power, research the micro-process and decision-making features of the investment in renewable energy power and also research the behavior characteristics of main bodies of power market in different situations. In the conditions of market economy, the traditional power generation and the power generation with renewable energy will coexist in power market in the long future. Conflict of interest is unavoidable. Nowadays, the structure of energy becomes more and more diversified. Cooperative game and non-cooperative game appear frequently at generation side, supply side, distribution side, demand side and government. It gradually becomes a cutting-edge research direction in current energy economy. This paper analyzes the game between our country and the countries with mature renewable energy technology in the aspect of independent research and development of technology and the strategy of technology introduction, the game between the enterprises with independent research and development and those with technology introduction in different subsidy policies, and the game between government and the enterprises with traditional power generation & the enterprises with the power generation of renewable energy. This is to explain the development strategy of renewable energy in different stages in our country, the encouragement function of encouragement policy to independent research and development of new technologies and the effectiveness of carbon tax to promoting the power generation using new energy. In addition, it can offer reference for constantly improving the encouragement policy for the development of renewable energy.
The Factors Affecting Main Game Participators' Economic Benefit
After separating power grid enterprises from power generation enterprises in power system, power grid enterprises and power generation enterprises become different main bodies of economic benefit. All of them strive for the maximization of investment earnings and economic benefit. Therefore, in the game of power with renewable energy, main participators include: enterprises of power generation with renewable energy, power grid enterprises, traditional power generation enterprises, government and users.
Power generation enterprises sell power generated to power grid enterprises. In other words, the income of power generation enterprises is the cost of power grid enterprises. The power generation of enterprises includes power generation with renewable energy and power generation with traditional energy. Therefore, the enterprises of power generation with renewable energy need to compete with other similar enterprises and game with the traditional power generation enterprises. To maximize limited benefit, power generation enterprises always have the motivation and impetus of increasing on-grid power and raising price of on-grid power. However, power grid enterprises try every means to lower the cost of power and unit price of power, decrease the expense of grid maintenance and expand the space of profit.
The profit made by power grid enterprises is got from the difference between the cost of purchasing power and the price of selling power. Therefore, the main factors that influence the profit made by power grid enterprises include: price of power sale and cost of power purchase. The price of power sale is the core element of power market and the most sensitive signal reflecting the change of supply and demand. There are three modes of pricing: (1) pricing of government, such as limiting the highest price as a monitoring means of government; (2) pricing in agreement: made in the contract signed between power purchase enterprises and power sale enterprises; (3) market pricing: made in market according to supply-demand relationship in market rules. In addition, the enterprises of power grid must consider the active guidance of government to renewable energy and the interest balance between renewable energy power generation enterprises and traditional power generation enterprises.
In the game relations, the main function of government is to solve the externality of renewable energy power for pushing forward the development of renewable energy, supervise enterprises to develop stably and normally and guarantee their legal and reasonable game and business operation.
Analysis on the Basic Assumptions and Models of Game

Analysis on technical game
On national layer, the investment strength and popularization degree of renewable energy is different in different countries. The development of renewable energy power technology is not synchronous, which leads to the difference of power generation technology on national layer. Therefore, while developing the power generation with renewable energy, the countries which are laggard in power generation technology need to make a choice between technology introduction and self technology development. A game forms because of the different interest of the two choices. In the initial stage of the development of renewable energy industry, most domestic relevant enterprises prefer to choose technology introduction. For economic benefit, this choice accords with the goal of maximizing their benefit. However, as for the whole wind power industry of China, it is not a good choice. So we can build a complete static game model to analyze the policy of Chinese government in the initial stage of developing renewable energy industry.
Game participators are Chinese government and the government of country with mature technology. The strategies faced by every participator are: independent research and development of technology and technology introduction. For analysis, the following assumptions are made:
1. The cost of certain technology research and development is C 1 (China) and C 2 (the country with mature technology). If the research and development is successful, the earning will be U.
2. When both China and the country with mature technology carry out research and development, C 1 will be larger than C 2 because of the laggard science and technology of China.
3. If the research and development of China and that of the country with mature technology is successful, the earning got will be shared equally.
4. If one party takes the lead in successful research and development, the party will get all earning. In addition, the other party will introduce the technology. The party which researches and develops successfully will get extra earning V from technology transfer.
The cost of technology introduction is Y; the earning from technology introduction is T. It is assumed that T > Y.
When strategic form is used to describe game, the game payment matrix in table 1 can be got. In table 1, when 0.5*U-C 1 >T-Y and U+V-C 1 >0 (namely China chooses independent research and development), the equilibrium solution of the game is (independent research and development, independent research and development) because C 1 >C 2 ; when 0.5*U-C 1 <T-Y and U+V-C 2 >0 (namely China chooses technology introduction), the equilibrium solution of the game is (technology introduction, independent research and development) because C 1 >C 2 .
There is an important assumption in this model: the scientific research level of the country with mature technology is higher than that of China. In the result and under the premise, the earning of the country with mature technology got from independent research and development is not less than the earning got from technology introduction no matter whether China chooses independent research and development or technology introduction. Therefore, research and development shall be the better strategy for the country with mature technology. Under the premise of the country with mature technology choosing independent research and development, the earning of China got from technology introduction is more than the earning got from independent research and development. Therefore, the better strategy of China is technology introduction. Therefore, the sole Nash Equilibrium in above game is (technology introduction, independent research and development).
We can know that the Nash Equilibrium in above game is significantly influenced by the assumed earning and cost. Therefore, in the initial stage of the development of renewable energy power generation, the strategy of technology introduction is correct. The ways of introduction can be various, including the introduction of regular equipment, international bidding invitation of special permission right, encouraging the investment of foreign-owned enterprises, multi-channel international cooperation and so on. Chinese government sufficiently utilizes late-mover advantage, strengthens technology introduction and absorption in many ways, enhances the level of domestic industry and constantly lowers the cost of power generation. With the rapid development of domestic wind power industry, the rise of the cost of wind turbine generators caused by technological barrier has greatly decreased the whole benefit of Chinese wind power industry. As for single wind power equipment manufacture enterprise, technology introduction can bring benefit immediately. However, in the long run, the limited technology of wind power equipment manufacture will hinder the development of wind power industry.
Analysis on the game of subsidy policy
With the development of new energy in China during the latest years, it is greatly demanded in domestic market. In the initial stage of market competition, large quantity of market shares can be got, which contributes to restraining competitors and getting more market benefit. Most enterprises purchase foreign technology and drawings and put it into production within short time. The direct economic benefit is prominent. Therefore, a large batch of enterprises enters the field of new energy. Only a small number of enterprises start their independent research and development for proprietary intellectual property rights.
Taking wind power for example, it is easy to manufacture wind-driven generator although it is high-tech product. After buying drawings and signing supply contract with wind power plant, motor, gearbox, principal axis, control system, paddles and other components bought can be assembled to be wind-driven generator for making profit. To stimulate independent research and development of enterprises, China Ministry of Finance issues Interim Procedures of Special Funds Management for the Industrialization of Wind Power Generation Equipment. The file stipulates the subsidy standard and using scope of the special fund arranged by Central Finance for the industrialization of wind power generation equipment. In addition, direct cash subsidy will be given to the manufactures of wind power generation equipment.
In the following, a simple complete information static game will be built to analyze the encouragement function of subsidy policy to enterprises' independent research and development.
Participators of the game are two enterprises: enterprise A and enterprise B. The strategies of each participator: independent research and development, technology introduction. For analysis, the following simplified assumptions are made:
1. The cost of technology introduction is Y and the cost of independent research and development is C; generally speaking, C>S.
2. The corresponding earning got from independent research and development is R which is same as the earning got from technology introduction.
3. The subsidy of government to the enterprises which choose independent research and development is S.
When strategic form is used to describe game, the game payment matrix in table 2 can be got. 
Independent research and development R-C+S, R-C+S R-C+S, R-Y Technology introduction R-Y, R-C+S R-Y, R-Y
When C-S>Y, Nash Equilibrium is (technology introduction, technology introduction) When C-S<Y, Nash Equilibrium is (Independent research and development, Independent research and development).
In the result, we can know that the amount of subsidy directly influences the enthusiasm of enterprises choosing independent research and development in the incentive policy of government. When the subsidy of government makes the cost of independent research and development lower than the cost of technology introduction, enterprises will consider relying on their own ability to raise the level of technology. Therefore, government issues Interim Procedures of Special Funds Management for the Industrialization of Wind Power Generation Equipment to effectively stimulate the independent development of Chinese wind power enterprises through offering subsidy.
As for power grid enterprises, traditional power generation technology is mature; power supply is stable in high efficiency. The generation technology with new energy is new and power supply is not stable. In addition, unstable power will increase the cost of power grid maintenance and power dispatching. Therefore, power grid enterprises need to make choice between the two kinds of enterprise while purchasing power of generation enterprises. In this case, power grid enterprises are possible to refuse power of new energy to connect grid for their own benefit. Renewable Energy Law of the People's Republic of China was put into implementation from January 1, 2006. It stipulates medium and long-term goal of total amount and development planning of renewable energy, encourages the development of renewable energy industry and technology development, supports grid-connected power generation with renewable energy, gives preference for renewable energy, apportions expenses of grid-connected power with the whole society, sets special fund for renewable energy and so on. Up to now, the legal system with the core Renewable Energy Law of the People's Republic of China has been established. In many articles, only a basic framework is made; although basic principle is put forward, the conditions of implementation have not been well prepared. . Renewable Energy Law of the People's Republic of China stipulates that: power grid enterprises must purchase all power generated by new energy. However, at present, near 30% wind power cannot be connected to grid. To raise enthusiasm of power grid enterprises purchasing wind power, our country gives certain subsidy for power grid enterprises connecting wind power to grid. Likewise, we can build a complete information static game model to analyze the effect of positive incentive policy.
Participators of the game are power grid enterprises and power generation enterprises. Power grid enterprises have two strategies: purchase and no purchase. Correspondingly, the government has three strategies: subsidy, penalty and no action (namely no subsidy and no penalty). For analysis, the following assumptions are made:
1. Generating capacity is E kwh. 2. The average price of grid-connected power of new energy is X yuan/kwh stipulated by the government; the average price of grid-connected power is P yuan/kwh. Generally speaking, X>P.
3. The subsidy of government to power grid enterprises for purchasing power of new energy is S yuan/kwh; the penalty for not purchasing power of new energy is C yuan/kwh.
4. The average cost of power grid enterprises for maintaining wind power is W yuan. So we can get payment matrix of the game shown in table 3-3. Table 3 . Payment matrix of grid connection subsidy game.
Government Subsidy
No action Penalty Power grid enterprises
From table 3, we can know that: government chooses penalty and EC>0 when power grid enterprise chooses "no purchase"; penalty will be the better strategy. When government chooses penalty, power grid enterprise chooses "purchase" and then gets payment -E(X-P)-W; power grid enterprise chooses "no purchase" and then gets payment -EC. Therefore, the strategy of power grid enterprise depends on the two values.
When -E(X-P)-W<-EC, the only Nash Equilibrium of the game is (no purchase, penalty); When -E(X-P)-W>-EC, the only Nash Equilibrium of the game is (purchase, penalty); When -E(X-P)-W= -EC, there is no difference between purchase and no purchase for power grid enterprises.
In the result of the game, the subsidy of government to power grid enterprises for accepting wind power connection to grid cannot get anticipative effect. However, the penalty to power grid enterprises for not accepting wind power connection to grid can effectively stimulate the connection of wind power to grid. In addition, the amount of penalty shall be larger than the grid-connection price of new energy power stipulated by the government minus grid-connection price of power grid evaluation plus the unit cost of technical transformation.
Therefore, proper economic incentive mechanism is a significant action of stimulating the power of new energy to connect to grid. The current subsidy policy of China needs to be further detailed and deepen.
Analysis on tax revenue game
Many countries of the world are levying tax for using fossil fuel (namely carbon tax). Carbon tax is a kind of pollution tax. It is levied according to the amount of carbon discharged from burning fossil fuel and aiming at the production, distribution and use of fossil fuel. Carbon tax mainly influences the field of energy. Taking power generation enterprises for example, the high cost of thermal power generation continues to rise with the levy of carbon tax. This stimulates power generation enterprises to invest the field of new energy and develop wind power, photoelectricity, small hydro-electric power and so on. Automobile enterprises will strengthen their investment in the field of new energy vehicles and replace traditional fuel power with electricity power. This levy of environmental tax will increase the cost of thermal power generation. Wind power and other new energy will strengthen the superiority of competition. Therefore, the levy of carbon tax is thought to be one of effective measures for stimulating power generation using new energy.
Although China has not started to levy carbon tax from domestic traditional power generation enterprises, this measure may bring benefit to the development of new energy referring to the experience of European and American countries. To analyze effectiveness of the measure, a simple game between government and power generation enterprises is made below.
Participators of the game are government and power generation enterprises. Government has two strategies: levy fossil fuel tax and no levy of fossil fuel tax. Power generation enterprises also have two strategies: coal-fired power generation and wind power generation. No power generation is also the strategy of power generation enterprises. For analysis, the following assumptions are made:
1. Coal-fired power plant and wind power plant have been built. Their generating capacity is E 1 kwh and E 2 kwh, respectively. For researching and analyzing the power generation of power plants, E=E 1 =E 2 .
2. The tax rate of fossil fuel consumption is T yuan/kg standard coal. 3. The consumption of standard coal in coal-fired power plant is A kg/kwh. The cost of power generation is C 1 yuan/kwh; the price of grid connection power is P yuan/kwh.
4. The cost of wind power generation is C 2 yuan/kwh. The price of grid connection power is same as that of coal-fired power plant. According to current cost of wind power, C 2 > C 1 .
Payment matrix of the game is shown in table 4: Table 4 . Payment matrix of tax levy game.
Power generating company Coal-fired power generation
Power generation using new energy Government Levy carbon tax (P-C 1 -AT)E, ATE (P-C 2 )E, 0 No levy of carbon tax (P-C 1 )E, 0 (P-C 2 )E, 0
From the payment matrix, we can know that: power generation enterprises choose coal-fired power generation when government chooses no levy of carbon tax; if government chooses to levy fossil fuel tax, the strategy of power generation enterprises depends on the payment level of different strategy combination. Detailed game analysis is made below:
Under the premise of levying fossil fuel tax, the necessary and sufficient condition of power generation enterprises choosing wind power generation is: (P-C 1 -AT) E<(P-C 2 ) E, namely AT>C 2 -C 1 . In other words, only when the fossil fuel tax levied meets above condition, power generation enterprises will choose new energy for power generation. Otherwise, they will still choose coal-fired power generation. In addition, this is the only Nash Equilibrium [18] . From above analysis, we can know that levy of fossil fuel tax cannot stimulate power generation using new energy but may react upon coal-fired power generation and influence the share of power generation using fossil fuel.
Therefore, the following conclusion can be drawn: at current development level of wind power industry of China, it is difficult to stimulate power generation enterprises to choose wind power generation through levying fossil fuel tax; or the only measure of levying fossil fuel tax cannot achieve the aim of stimulating power generation enterprises to choose wind power generation. With improvement of the ability of Chinese independent research and development and decrease of the cost of wind power generation, power generation enterprises will inevitably decrease the shares of fossil fuel power generation and increase the shares of new energy power generation.
Chinese government has made sufficient analysis on the necessity and feasibility of levying fossil fuel tax. The levy of fossil fuel tax (namely carbon discharge tax) contributes to the internalization of negative external effect produced from consuming fossil fuel. Energy consumption can be decreased through increasing the cost of using energy. Therefore, levy of carbon discharge tax is one of effective economic means of stimulating energy conservation and emission reduction and building environment-friendly society.
Summary
In the multi-party game market of diversified energy structure, various games exist "everywhere". In the three aspects of technology, incentive policy and tax levy, this paper mainly analyzes the game relationship between our country and the countries with mature technology of power generation using renewable energy, between the power generation enterprises with different approaches of developing new technology, and between traditional power generation enterprises and the power generation enterprises using renewable energy. Apart from the above, the game relationship between different power generation technologies using renewable energy, between power grid enterprises and power generation enterprises, and between external environment and the enterprises with indeterminate change of cost and technology of renewable energy power generation can be valuable research directions in this field.
